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There are two jobs at the level of Adjunct Professor (but I think they're fixed-term). One in logic and one in philosophy of science. The postings are in Polish, but from what I gather, they actually need someone who would teach in English, and none of the postings literally require that the applicant should speak Polish. The calls are available here: http://www.uw.edu.pl/strony/praca/nauk/adiunkt_logika.pdf http://www.uw.edu.pl/strony/praca/nauk/wfis_a.pdf The deadline is June 14, the decisions are  to be made on June 25. The calls don't mention who you should contact with informal inquiries, but the chair of logic is directed by Prof. Anna Wójtowicz and the chair of philosophy of science is directed by Prof. Krzysztof Wójtowicz . 

My book on Leśniewski,  Leśniewski's Systems of Logic and Foundations of Mathematics , is coming out soon (it's already available on Springer's website ). It is not my PhD dissertation. I wrote the whole book pretty much anew and only part of the material overlaps with my dissertation. And even the stuff that I already included in my dissertation is different: I re-worked the material to make it more accessible and slightly less boring (probably failing at least at the latter task). HT to Severi Hamari , who co-authored one of the chapters.

Joanna Golińska-Pilarek's project "Logics for Qualitative Reasoning" requires some staff. One postdoc and one predoc position available. More details: http://www.logicsforqr.uw.edu.pl/positions.html

New: Deadline Extended to Monday, March 11th The Department of Philosophy at Lund University, Sweden, hosts two back-to-back workshops on: The Philosophy of Information and Information Quality Friday, May 10, 2013 http://www.fil.lu.se/index.php?id=18880 and Intensionality in Mathematics Saturday and Sunday, May 11-12, 2013 http://www.fil.lu.se/index.php?id=18879 INVITED SPEAKERS Friday Luciano Floridi (University of Hertfordshire, UK,  www.philosophyofinformation.net ) Phyllis Illari (University College London, UK,  www.ucl.ac.uk/sts/staff/illari ) Kevin Korb (Monash University, Australia,  www.csse.monash.edu.au/~korb/ ) Saturday and Sunday Francesca Boccuni (University Vita-Salute San Raffaele, Milan, Italy,  http://francescaboccuni.wordpress.com/ ) Walter Dean (University of Warwick,  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/philosophy/people/faculty/dean/ ) Fredrik Engström (University of Gothenburg,  http://engstrom.morot.org/...

While the standard informal interpretation of Goedel's sentence: [G]   I am (/This sentence is) not provable. is quite well-known, it's dual sentence: [DG] I am (/This sentence is) refutable. studied, for instance, by Smullyan, isn't. Yet, pretty much like you can run an argument for incompleteness using the former, you can also run a parallel argument using the latter. Just because it's fun to see how this works (if you're geeky enough), here's how it goes (it's quite easy).  For simplicity let's assume the background theory is sound (it proves only truths) and sufficiently expressive. One of the easiest arguments for incompleteness using [G] goes like this. Suppose [G] is false. Then (because of what it says) it is provable, which contradicts soundness. So [G] is true. If [G] is true, it is not provable, so we have the first half of incompleteness. Given that [G] is true, its negation is false. If ~[G] is false, it cannot be provable...